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Recently, some authors have begun to raise questions about the 
potential unity of 4E (enactive, embedded, embodied, extended) 
cognition as a distinct research programme within cognitive 
science. Two tensions, in particular, have been raised: (i) that 
the body-centric claims embodied cognition militate against the 
distributed tendencies of extended cognition and (ii) that the 
body/environment distinction emphasized by enactivism stands 
in tension with the world-spanning claims of extended 
cognition. The goal of this paper is to resolve tensions (i) and 
(ii). The proposal is that a form of ‘wide computationalism’ can 
be used to reconcile the two tensions and, in so doing, articulate 
a common theoretical core for 4E cognition. 
Keywords: 4E cognition, wide computationalism, body-
centrism, extended functionalism, autopoietic theory 
Introduction 
Enactive, embodied, embedded and extended cognition, or 
simply 4E cognition, has often been thought to form a 
collective challenge to traditional or classical cognitive 
science (Menary, 2010). Common to many of these views is 
the idea that cognitive processes are often integrated with 
and heavily dependent on bodily and environmental 
structures (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991; Clark & 
Chalmers, 1998; Haugeland, 1998; Hutto & Myin, 2013).  
More recently, some authors have begun to raise questions 
about the potential unity of 4E cognition as a distinct 
research programme within cognitive science (Clark, 2008a; 
Clark & Kiverstein, 2009; Menary, 2010). Two tensions, in 
particular, have been raised: (i) that the body-centric claims 
embodied cognition militate against the distributed 
tendencies of extended cognition and (ii) that the 
body/environment distinction emphasized by enactivism 
stands in tension with the world-spanning claims of 
extended cognition. These two tensions constitute a problem 
for cognitive science insofar as 4E cognition is thought to 
form distinct field of study, and not merely a loose set of 
alphabetically related approaches (Ward & Stapleton, 2012).  
The goal of this paper is to resolve tensions (i) and (ii). 
The proposal is that a form of ‘wide computationalism’ can 
be used to reconcile the two tensions, and, in so doing, 
articulate a common theoretical core for 4E cognition. It is 
argued that wide computationalism satisfies the various 
demands of the embodied, enactive and extended theorists 
in virtue of placing a simultaneous emphasis on abstract 
analysis and functional mechanisms. 
Two Tensions in 4E Cognition 
Following Clark and Kiverstein (2009), three ‘strands’ 
can be identified as generating the two tensions within 4E 
cognition, these include: body-centrism, extended 
functionalism, and autopoietic theory.  
The first strand is body-centrism. This is the idea that the 
body has a non-trivial role in determining mental states and 
functioning, that the details of a creature’s embodiment have 
a profound affect on the nature and functioning of the mind 
(Noë & Reagan, 2001; Noë, 2004; Gallagher, 2005). 
Shapiro, for instance, writes: “[P]sychological processes are 
incomplete without the body’s contributions. Vision for 
human beings is a process that includes features of the 
human body. This means that a description of various 
perceptual capacities cannot maintain body-neutrality” 
(2004, p.190). The body is depicted as ‘intrinsically 
special.’ Body-centrists hold that without discussion of the 
unique contribution of bodily structures and activities, 
cognitive explanations are crucially lacking. The view is 
also sometimes called the “constitutive-contribution claim” 
(Clark, 2008a). 
Support for body-centrism comes from research 
highlighting the functional dependences of mental processes 
on bodily structures and activities (Clark, 2008a, b). Work 
on embodiment and conceptualization, for example, 
demonstrates that understanding abstract concepts, such as 
love, often depends on the metaphorical expansions of more 
familiar concepts, such as up and down or front and back 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
The second strand is extended functionalism. For the 
extended functionalist, cognitive systems are functional 
wholes distributed across diverse sets of components and 
processes. Cognitive activities involve a complex balancing 
act between brain, body and world  (Harman 1998, Clark & 
Chalmers, 1998; Wilson 2004; Wheeler, 2010). The spirit of 
 extended functionalism is embodied in what Clark and 
Chalmer’s (1998) call the ‘parity principle’, which says: 
“[i]f, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions 
as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have 
no hesitation in recognizing as a part of the cognitive 
process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of 
the cognitive process” (p.29). The parity principle stresses 
the location neutrality of cognitive analysis. It highlights 
abstract, functional analysis in place of detailed 
physiological investigations. The view is also sometimes 
called the “distributor role” in discussions of embodied 
cognition (Wilson & Foglia, 2016).  
Support for extended functionalism comes from research 
focusing on the way in which cognizers often exploit, 
scaffold, and distribute cognitive activates across bodily and 
environment structures (Clark, 2005, 2008b). Work on 
problem solving, for example, shows that people often 
simplify and transform complex problems, such as the 
Tower of Hanoi, by manipulating physical environments 
(Kirsh & Maglio, 1995; Kirsh, 2009).  
The final strand to consider is ‘autopoietic theory.’ The 
central claim of autopoietic theory is that cognitive systems 
are created by the reciprocal interaction of internal and 
external components in the service of some larger function, 
such as homeostasis (Weber and Varela, 2002). Autopoietic 
theory connects to 4E cognition via the notion of ‘sense 
making’.  
Autopoietic theory maintains that because living systems, 
such as cognition, are autonomous, self-regulating systems, 
and sense making is required for maintaining a system’s 
boundary, autopoietic systems produce and maintain a 
physical boundary between the organism and its physical 
environment. Because sense making is a self-regulating act, 
organisms often bring forth meaning on the basis of their 
autonomy – autonomy in this context means actively 
sustaining identity under precarious circumstances. A 
system maintains its organization by regulating its 
interactions with the environment via sense making 
(Thompson, 2007; Wheeler, 2009). 
Consider how each of the three strands fit within 4E 
cognition. First, enactivism and embodied cognition often 
endorse body-centrism in virtue of emphasizing what they 
take to be the unique contributions of bodily structures and 
activities, such as sensorimotor knowledge. Second, 
extended cognition often endorses extended functionalism 
by assigning a non-trivial role to environmental elements in 
sustaining cognitive activities. Third, enactivism is often 
framed in terms of autopoietic theory insofar as sense 
making is treated as a constitutive element of demarcating 
the organism/environment boundary. 
Not every version of enactivism is committed to 
autopoietic theory, and not every version of embodied 
cognition is committed to body-centrism. There is, at least 
in principle, some compatibility between the various views. 
Nonetheless, because some versions of each view are, as a 
matter of fact, committed to the different strands, the two 
tensions do represent a substantial challenge for 4E 
cognition. 
Consider, then, how the three strands generate the two 
tensions. The first tension follows from the fact that if the 
body has a non-trivial role in determining mental states, 
then cognition cannot also be location neutral; the converse 
of which is that if cognition is location neutral, then the 
body cannot have a privileged status in cognition. If the 
body is simply an instrument through which larger 
functional complexes are realized, then bodily structures 
cannot form the exclusive realization base of cognitive 
activities. Extended functionalism precludes the constitutive 
contribution claims of body-centrism, while body-centrism 
precludes the possibility of cognitive systems extending 
beyond the boundary of the individual. 
The second tension emerges from the idea that if extended 
functionalism is correct, and cognitive systems can stretch 
out into the world, then living systems cannot also be co-
extensive with cognitive systems, as per enactivism. Here is 
Clark and Kiverstein (2009) diagnosing the situation:  
If living systems and cognitive systems are identical, 
both systems must have boundaries that coincide. 
However, the boundaries of the living systems are the 
physical boundaries of the organism. If extended 
functionalism is correct, the boundaries of cognitive 
systems can criss-cross the physical boundaries of the 
organism. This is precisely what the enactivists cannot 
allow. (p.2).  
Extended cognition requires that cognitive systems recruit 
resources outside the boundary of the individual. 
Enactivism, however, denies this possibility. It therefore 
undercuts the identification of cognitive systems with 
extended systems by maintaining a sharp distinction 
between the physical boundaries of the organism and the 
environment, assuming also that each view is taken to be a 
global thesis about cognition.  
Tensions (i) and (ii) emerge as a function of the opposing 
elements within 4E cognition. Tension (i) emerges as a 
result of body-centrism’s emphasis on the unique 
contribution of the bodily structures, while tension (ii) 
follows from the location-neutrality of extended 
functionalism. The tensions are important for at least two 
reasons. One is that they stand to undermine the collective 
thrust of 4E cognition by showcasing fractures within the 
larger framework (Clark, 2008a). Another is that they reveal 
a lack of ‘deep theoretical core’ within 4E cognition. They 
expose a conceptual gap at the centre of an otherwise 
vibrant and animated collection of research (Clark & 
Kiverstein, 2009).  
One constructive proposal that has been offered to resolve 
the first of the two tensions is Clark (2008a). Clark’s 
suggestion is that the body plays an enabling computational 
role within cognitive processes that selectively impacts both 
conscious and non-conscious computational strategies. 
Clark’s view is that the first tension can be resolved by 
 viewing bodily structures in terms of enabling different 
kinds of information processing. The cognitive significance 
of the body resides in the functional role it occupies within 
‘intelligent’ organization – this is what explains the intuition 
that the body makes a special contribution to cognition.  
Clark’s proposal, although not explicitly, also provides a 
solution to the ‘deep theoretical core’ problem. This is 
because it articulates, at least in principle, a common 
‘computational/functional core’ for 4E cognition. 
Embedded, embodied, and extended approaches are unified 
by a shared emphasis on distributed functional complexes 
supporting cognitive activities. What is important is that 
bodily or environmental structures are situated within a 
larger computational/functional framework during 
investigation. Some systems will be individual bound (as 
per enactive and embodied cognition), while others will 
spread out across brain, body and world (as per extended 
cognition).  
One problem with Clark’s response, despite its 
advantages, is that it fails to specify the relationship 
between physical mechanisms and computational systems 
finely enough. It fails to cash out what it is that allows the 
body to play its ‘enabling role’ in cognitive activities in the 
first place. If the body is merely one element within a larger 
brain-body-world complex, why should it have such a 
constraining and enabling role? The problem is not that 
Clark is wrong in proposing that the body has an enabling 
computational role, but that the suggestion alone does not 
suffice to specify what the role amounts to and why it 
should prove important.  
Two Tensions Resolved 
In what follows, we argue that Clark’s proposal can be 
supplemented and further developed by appealing to the 
notion of ‘wide computationalism’. We begin by outlining 
and motivating wide computationalism and then turn to 
showing how the view addresses each of the two tensions.  
Wide computationalism is the view that some of the units 
of computational cognitive systems reside outside the 
individual (Wilson, 1994, 1995, 2004; Hutchins, 1995; 
Clark & Wilson, 2009; Kersten, 2016; Kersten & Wilson, 
2016). Wide computationalism stakes a claim on the scope 
of physical systems, processes, and components that are 
capable of supporting computational analysis. A wide 
computational perspective opens up the possibility of 
exploring computational units that include the brain and 
aspects of the beyond-the-head environment. 
Wide computationalism gains a theoretical foothold via 
the location neutrality of computational individuation. Since 
formal systems are indifferent to physical medium and 
computation is a formal system, it is possible that at least 
some states and processes relevant to a computational 
system may reside outside the individual. Nothing in the 
method of computational individuation precludes the 
possibility of wide computational systems.  
Traditionally, wide computationalism has been committed 
to what some call “causal mapping accounts” of 
computation (Chalmers, 1994; Chrisley, 1995). Causal 
mapping accounts maintain that in order for a physical 
system to implement an actual computation there must be a 
mapping of computational states to physical states such that 
transitions between the physical states result in 
corresponding transitions between the computational states. 
Causal mapping accounts, whether wide or narrow, 
articulate the conditions for ascription of computational 
implementation in terms of isomorphic mappings between 
computational descriptions and physical descriptions via 
transitions between physical states. 
More recently, some have argued that wide 
computationalism should adopt a ‘mechanistic’ approach to 
computation (Kersten, 2016). Wide mechanistic 
computation differs from causal mapping formulations in 
that it frames the conditions of concrete computation in 
terms of functional mechanisms (Milkowski, 2013, 2015; 
Piccinini, 2015; Dewhurst, 2016). Mechanistic accounts 
maintain that concrete computations occur wherever there is 
a physical system that has an organization of spatiotemporal 
components such that it computes an abstract function in 
virtue of manipulating medium-independent vehicles. The 
mechanistic approach emphasizes functionally integrated 
systems that compute at least one abstract function via 
vehicle manipulation.  
The wide account of computation extends the mechanistic 
reasoning to brain-body-world systems. It maintains that 
whether or not functional mechanisms, ones that process 
medium-independent vehicles, are constituted by 
spatiotemporal components squarely localized within the 
individual or crisscrossing into the world is an a posteriori 
question. Since the mechanistic conditions on concrete 
computations are medium and location neutral, the question 
of wide computational systems is an open one – some 
physical computing cognitive systems may be ensconced 
within the body, while others may be spread out over brain, 
body and world.  
In addition to its theoretical plausibility, wide 
computationalism also gains support from studies in animal 
and human psychology. There is a natural set of phenomena 
productively studied by wide computationalism. 
Research in form perception, for example, shows that 
formal primitives in the environment are often relevant to 
computationally explaining the construction of complex, 
internal representations. Wilson (1994, 1995) takes such 
work to be indicative of a wide computational system, as it 
acknowledges the unique computational role of states 
beyond the individual within perceptual processing.  
Research on the spatial navigation of bats has also been 
used to support wide computationalism. Kersten (2016), for 
instance, argues that bats’ navigation system instantiates a 
wide computational system in virtue of employing a 
functional mechanism that spans the brain, body and world, 
and which processes medium-independent acoustic vehicles. 
Bat morphology, acoustic signals and neural processing 
conspire to support object detection along vertical planes 
using a wide computational system (MacIver, 2009).  
 Finally, Hutchins (1995) has argued for the presence of 
wide computation in the context of ship navigation. 
Hutchins’ claim is that members of a navigation team carry 
out computational tasks that extend beyond the local actions 
of individual team members, which is indicative of a wide 
computational system. 
The central message is that wide computational systems 
are not only theoretically plausible, but they are actually 
implemented in a number of cases. Research in human and 
animal psychology delivers several examples of concrete 
computational systems that extend beyond the boundary of 
the individual. In what follows, we adopt the wide 
mechanistic account of computation, though, for ease of 
exposition, we refer to it simply wide computationalism. 
Consider how wide computationalism might address the 
first of the two tensions. Noë (2004), for instance, writes: 
“If perception is in part constituted by out and out 
possession and exercise of bodily skills…then it may also 
depend on our possession of the sorts of bodies that can 
encompass those skills, for only creatures with such a body 
could have those skills” (p.25). Noë and other body-centrists 
are at pains to highlight the role and contribution of bodily 
actions in cognitive processes. Such considerations motivate 
the claim that bodily-structures are constitutive of cognitive 
processes.  
The wide mechanistic account can accommodate these 
types of considerations by focusing on functional 
mechanisms. A system is a functional mechanism when it 
consists of a set of spatiotemporal components that 
contribute to the system’s overall function in virtue of the 
organization and interaction of its component parts 
(Piccinini, 2015, p.119). For the wide computationalist, the 
set of bodily and neural structures responsible for delivering 
visual perception are the functional mechanism that carry 
out the larger, computational task under investigation. This 
means that the claims of the body-centrist can be reframed 
in terms of ‘wide’ functional mechanisms; these are 
mechanisms whose component parts are spread out over 
internal and environmental elements (see Menary, 2007, 
ch.2). The constitutively embodied systems, such as in the 
case of vision, are the wide functional mechanisms localized 
to the body-brain complex. One way to understand body-
centric theorists, then, is as making fine-grained statements 
about wide functional mechanisms. 
Consider the extended functionalist side of the equation. 
In applying the method of computational analysis to world-
individual spanning systems, wide computationalism 
maintains a commitment to the location neutrality of 
cognition. What matters for the wide computationalist is the 
functional capacity being investigated, not the physical 
medium through which it is realized. The implication is that 
extended functionalism’s emphasis on medium 
independence and abstract analysis is preserved within wide 
computationalism. The view retains the abstract form of 
analysis crucial to the extended functionalist.  
A resolution to the first tension is in sight. By re-
envisaging body-centrism in terms of the implementation of 
wide computational systems space is opened up for the 
tight, causal integration of bodily and neuronal processes in 
support of cognitive processes (i.e., wide functional 
mechanisms) and the locational neutrality of computational 
individuation (i.e., wide computational analysis). The 
special status of bodily structures turns out to be species of a 
more general class of wide mechanistic systems. The only 
difference is that whereas some wide functional mechanisms 
are instantiated within individuals (as highlighted by body-
centrism), others are instantiated by the brain, body and 
world (as highlighted by extended functionalism).  
Consider the second tension. Enactivism, of the 
autopoietic variety, was unimpressed by the blurring of the 
organism/environment boundary within extended 
functionalism. The enactivist claimed that if cognitive 
systems were autopoietic systems then it followed that 
cognitive systems could not be extended, the underlying 
assumption being that autopoietic systems were organism 
bound.  
One route to reconciling the two views is to show that 
autopoietic theory is compatible with computationalism 
more generally, assuming also that extended functionalism 
is congenial to wide computationalism more generally (see 
Wilson, 2004). Insofar as wide computationalism is a 
species of computationalism, the compatibility of 
computationalism with autopoietic systems theory suffices 
to show the compatibility of extended functionalism with 
autopoietic theory. 
One reason to think that autopoietic theory is compatible 
with computationalism is a common emphasis on mechanistic 
explanation (Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000; Bechtel, 
2008). Consider, for instance, what Maturana and Varela 
(1980) write about the methodology of autopoietic theory:  
An explanation [of autopoietic theory] is always a 
reformulation of a phenomenon showing how its 
components generate it through their interactions and 
relations...the elements used in the explanations are 
bodies and their properties…they are relations and 
their relations, independently of the nature of the 
bodies that satisfy them…This mode of thinking is not 
new, and is explicitly related to the very name of 
mechanisms. (pp. 75-76). 
Autopoietic theory is, at root, a functional or mechanistic 
approach to explanation. What matters is that systems are 
explained in terms of the interaction of component parts 
with each other and the environment, regardless of whether 
the systems under investigation are biological or cognitive 
in character. There is a functional/mechanistic mode of 
explanation underlying autopoietic theory.  
Compare this with computationalism. Computational 
analysis involves detailing how the arrangement and 
interaction of various components conspire to process 
information bearing vehicles. The mechanistic account 
requires showing how concrete, functional mechanisms 
compute medium-independent vehicles in virtue of 
 processing some portion of their physical structure. 
Computational analysis is also a species of mechanistic 
explanation (Milkowski, 2013). 
There turns out, then, to be little incompatibility between 
computationalism and autopoietic theory. Both approaches 
employ something like a mechanistic explanatory strategy 
when investigating phenomena, although autopoietic theory 
is generally pitched at lower-level biological phenomena 
than computationalism. The common focus on mechanistic 
explanation ensures that there will be an overlapping set of 
phenomena productively studied by both approaches. 
Why, then, the perceived tension? One reason is that 
many of the systems analyzed by autopoietic theory are 
located or ensconced within the organism. Most autopoietic 
systems are contained within the organism as a matter of 
empirical fact. However, this alone does not imply that all 
systems must be analyzed so as to localize within the 
individual; parts of the environment may still come to be 
included within the larger analysis. In principle, autopoietic 
theory, similar to computationalism, is location neutral.  
Another reason for the perceived tension is that some 
within the enactivism literature assume that 
computationalism implies a commitment to representation 
and/or information processing theories (Di Paolo, 2009). 
These authors assume that because computationalism entails 
a commitment to representation and information processing 
theories, and autonomous, self-regulating systems stand in 
contrast to these views, enactivism must be opposed to 
computationalism.  
However, as the previous discussion of mechanistic 
computation illustrates, there are a number of viable 
accounts of computation that are minimal in their 
commitment to representation or information processing 
theories (Stich, 1983; Egan, 1995; Piccinini, 2008). There is 
little reason to think that an opposition to representation and 
information processing commits enactivism to an opposition 
to computationalism more generally.  
The point to note is that because wide computationalism 
places a greater emphasis on the way in in computational 
processes are grounded in particular physical mechanisms it 
creates a link between the body-centric claims of enactivism 
and embodied cognition, on the one hand, and the functional 
considerations of extended cognition, on the other. It is in 
virtue of analyzing mechanisms from several vantages – 
some quite fine-grained, others quite coarse-grained – that 
wide computationalism is able to mediate the competing 
claims of the three strands. The view offers a philosopher’s 
stone of sorts through which to translate the various claims 
of the enactivist, embodied and extended theorist.  
To be a bit more specific, tension (i) is resolved by the 
fact that wide computationalism allows the claims of the 
body-centrist to be reframed in terms of wide functional 
mechanisms, while tension (ii) is resolved by the fact that 
wide computationalism, in virtue of being a species of 
computationalism more generally, is theoretically 
compatible with the basic methodology of autopoietic 
theory. The success of wide computationalism, therefore, 
stems from the fact that it retains several of the central 
insights and elements that prove important to embodied, 
enactive and extended theorists.  
One interesting implication of the preceding analysis is 
that it reveals what might be called the 
‘computational/mechanistic’ core of 4E cognition. The 
discussion of wide computationalism goes some way to 
showing that something akin to ‘computational/mechanistic’ 
explanation may underwrite a fair amount of 4E cognition. 
Mechanistic explanations, which are explanations of 
systems in terms of the activities and organization of 
component parts, turn out to be important not only for 
cognitive science and psychology more generally, but for 4E 
cognition specifically (Craver, 2006). This point is only 
provisional, of course. But it does point to a promising 
future line of inquiry. A continued focus on the 
‘computational/mechanistic’ underpinnings of 4E cognition 
may well serve to further clarify and unify the field as a 
whole. 
Conclusion 
The preceding discussion is only the first step in a larger 
analysis. More still needs to be said. Nonetheless, the 
discussion is important because it offers one route to 
resolving the two tensions troubling 4E cognition. What’s 
more, the discussion shows that a renewed focus on 
computationalism, particularly of the wide variety, may 
have key role to play in illuminating the conceptual 
foundations of 4E cognition. This result is both interesting 
and novel, as discussions of 4E cognition sometimes eschew 
mention of computation. By showing that a form of 
computationalism provides a theoretically flexible yet 
robust vehicle through which to understand and translate the 
various strands of 4E cognition, the current discussion 
provides not only a partial vindication of wide 
comptuatiaonlism, but also helps to shed light on an 
important set of issues facing a growing research 
programme within cognitive science.  
References  
Adams, F., & Aizawa, K. (2008). The bounds of cognition. 
Malden: Blackwell. 
Bechtel, W. (2008). Mental Mechanisms: Philosophical 
Perspectives on Cognitive Neuroscience. London, 
Routledge.  
Chalmers, D. (1994). On implementing a computation. 
Minds and Machines, 4(4), 391–402. 
Clark, A. (2005). Intrinsic content, active memory, and the 
extended mind. Analysis, 65, 1–11. 
Clark, A. (2008a). Pressing the Flesh: A Tension in the 
Study of the Embodied, Embedded Mind? Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 76(1), 37-59. 
Clark, A. (2008b). Supersizing the mind: Embodiment, 
action, and cognitive extension. New York: Oxford. 
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The Extended Mind. 
Analysis, 58, 7-19. 
 Clark, A., & Kiverstein, J. (2009). Introduction: Mind 
Embodied, Embedded, Enacted: One Church or Many? 
Topoi, 28, 1-7.  
Craver, C. (2006). When Mechanistic Models Explain. 
Synthese, 153(3), 355-76.  
Chrisley, R.L. (1995). Why everything doesn’t realize every 
computation. Minds and Machines 4: 403–430. 
Dewhurst, J. (2016). Review of Physical Computation. 
Philosophical Psychology. DOI: 562 
10.1080/09515089.2016.1150450. 
Di Paolo, E. A. (2009). Extended Life. Topoi, 28, 9-21. 
Egan, F. (1995). Computation and Content. Philosophical 
Review, 104, 181-203. 
Gallagher, S. (2005). How the body shapes the mind. 
Oxford: OUP. 
Haugeland, J. (1998). Mind Embodied and Embedded. In J. 
Haugeland (ed.), Having Thought: Essays in the 
Metaphysics of Mind (pp. 233- 267). Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.  
Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the wild. Cambridge: MIT 
Press. 
Hutto, D. and Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing Enactivism: 
Basic minds without content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Lakoff, G. (1980). The Metaphorical Structure of the 
Human Conceptual System. Cognitive Science, 4, 195-
208. 
Machamer, P. K., Darden, L., & Craver, C. (2000). Thinking 
about Mechanisms. Philosophy of Science, 67: 1-25.  
MacIver, M.A. 2009. Neuroethology: From morphological 
computation to planning. In (eds.) P. Robbins and M. 
Aydede, The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition 
(pp.480–504). New York, Cambridge University Press. 
Maturana, H. R., & Varela, F. J. (1980). Autopoiesis and 
cognition: the realization of the living. Dordrecht, 
Holland: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Menary, R. (2007). Cognitive integration: Mind and 
cognition unbounded. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Menary, R. (2010). Introduction to the special issue on 4E 
cognition. Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, 9:459–
463. 
Machamer, P. K., Darden, L., & Craver, C. (2000). Thinking 
about Mechanisms. Philosophy of Science, 67, 1-25.  
MacIver, M.A. (2009). Neuroethology: From morphological 
computation to planning. In (eds.) P. Robbins and M. 
Aydede, The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition 
(pp.480–504). New York, Cambridge University Press. 
Milkowski, M. (2013). Explaining the Computational Mind. 
Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press. 
Milkowski, M. (2015). Computational mechanism and models 
of cognition. Philosophia Scientiae 18(3): 1–14. 
Noë, A. (2004). Action in Perception. MIT Press. 
Kersten, L., & Wilson, R.A (2016). The Sound of Music: 
Externalist Style. American Philosophical Quarterly, 53(2), 
139-154. 
Kersten, L. (2016). A Mechanistic Account of Wide 
Computationalism. Review of Psychology and Philosophy, 
(online), 1-17. 
Kirsch, D. (2009). Problem solving and situated cognition. 
In (eds.) P. Robbins and M. Aydede, The Cambridge 
Handbook of Situated Cognition, (pp. 264–306). New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Kirsh, D., & Maglio, P. (1995). On distinguishing epistemic 
from pragmatic actions. Cognitive Science, 18, 513-549.  
O’Regan, J. & Noë, A. (2001). A sensorimotor account of 
vision and visual consciousness. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 25(4), 883–975. 
Piccinini, G. (2007). Computing mechanisms. Philosophy of 
Science, 74(4): 501–526. 
Piccinini, G. (2008). Computation without Representation. 
Philosophical Studies, 137(20), 205-241. 
Piccinini, G. (2015). Physical Computation: A Mechanistic 
Account. Published to Oxford Scholarship Online. doi: 
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658855.001.0001. 
Stich, S. (1983). From folk psychology to cognitive science. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in Life: Biology, 
phenomenology, and the sciences of mind. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Varela, F., E. Thompson, and E. Rosch. (1991). The 
embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Weber, A., & Varela, F. J. (2002). Life after Kant: Natural 
purposes and the autopoietic foundation of individuality. 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1(2), 97–125. 
Wheeler, M. (2009). Reconstructing the Cognitive World. 
MIT Press. 
Wheeler, M. (2010). In defense of extended functionalism. 
In R. Menary (Ed.), The Extended Mind (pp. 245-270). 
MIT Press. 
Wilson, R. (1994). Wide computationalism. Mind, 103(4), 
351–372. 
Wilson, R. (1995). Cartesian psychology and physical 
minds: Individualism and the sciences of the minds. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wilson, R. (2004). Boundaries of the mind: The individual 
in the fragile sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Wilson, R. (2010). Extended vision. In (eds.) N. 
Gangopadhyay, M. Madary, and F. Spicer, Perception, 
action and consciousness (pp.277–290). New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Wilson, R.A., and Clark, A. (2009). How to situate 
cognition: Letting nature take its course. In (eds.) M. 
Aydede and P. Robbins, The Cambridge handbook of 
situated cognition (pp.55–77). New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Wilson, R. A., & Foglia, L. (2016). Embodied cognition. In 
E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford 
University.  
